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Abstract—Access logs may offer service providers a lot of 
information about specific users. Depending on the type of the 
service offers, the operator is capable of obtaining the user’s IP, 
location, communication habits, device information and so on. In 
this paper, we analyze a sample instant messenger service that is 
operating for a certain period of time. In our sandbox, we gathered 
enough data to correlate user communication habits with their 
localization, and even contacts. We show how seriously metadata 
may impact the user’s privacy and make some recommendations 
about mitigating the quantity of data collected in connection with 
this type of services. 
 
Keywords—metadata, privacy, cybersecurity, instant 
messaging, access logs 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ETADATA are providing information about other data. 
Metadata serve a number of purposes - from describing 
resources, to describing data structures to providing statistical 
information about data processing. From the point of view of 
user privacy, the last of the metadata types listed above has the 
highest value, as it may identify the purpose of data, time and 
date of their creation, author, location (via IP address), source 
and the process used for their creation.  
 According to [1], metadata are extensively being used by 
governments as a great source of information about citizens’ 
activity. When it comes to analyzing the activity of employees, 
especially at government agencies, the list of data types 
collected is much longer. It is possible to recover information 
about the activity of a given user in specific databases, to 
analyze their search history, communication patterns, software 
installed, telephone bills, etc. In cooperation with companies 
such as Google, Twitter or Facebook, it is even possible to 
disclose information about personal contacts, with their email 
and physical addresses, phone numbers and history of their 
payments. Metadata contains information about the time at 
which the user has logged in to specific service, the time at 
which their online activity began, and information about the 
source IP address. Metadata may be also used for linking 
different accounts used by the same user during a specific period 
of time.  
 Instant messenger services, such as Signal or WhatsApp, are 
also collecting great amounts of metadata. Even if all 
communications are encrypted, the service provider still collects 
metadata about those encrypted messages and calls. Thus, the 
service provider will have, at their possession, data about the 
source and destination IP (location) of communicating parties, 
their phone numbers, date and time of each communication, 
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duration of each call, device identifiers, operating system 
version, time of reading the message, etc. Usually, such a set of 
data is sufficient to identify user habits, their contacts, places 
they have visited, location of their home and office, and even to 
define the probability of meeting them physically at a specific 
location. 
 Many papers have dealt with the privacy of instant messenger 
service users. In [2], the authors focus on explicit policies for 
protecting user privacy. [3] presents privacy concerns regarding 
receipts confirming that messages have been read. The authors 
of [4] discuss the impact of Snapchat’s disappearing messages, 
from the perspective of acceptance of social media technologies. 
However, no papers have been dedicated strictly to the 
technological aspects of collecting and analyzing access logs, 
and to identifying this specific type of user privacy-related risk. 
In this paper, we present a model of an instant messaging 
service that has been implemented for the purpose of collecting 
user metadata. The amounts and types of data collected do not 
differ from the actual practices relied upon by current market 
leaders. This study focuses on the technical aspect of the data 
analysis process, i.e. on the collection of data, their correlations, 
and on obtaining extra information, such as user location - all 
with the assistance of a dedicated analytical app. The results 
gathered and their implications are discussed as well, thus 
offering the service providers an opportunity to implement 
changes required to guarantee the privacy of their service users.     
II. INSTANT MESSAGING SERVICE MODEL 
In order to collect sufficient amounts of metadata, a toy 
version of an instant messaging service had to be created. In the 
following chapters of this paper, the term TIMS (Toy Instant 
Messaging Service) will be used to identify the service and the 
apps that have been created. TIMS specification is similar to that 
of such services as WhatsApp [5] or Viber [6], namely: 
- Users are identified based on their phone number; 
- All communications are end-to-end encrypted; 
- Users are sending their messages via a central server; 
- Users are making VoIP calls – this process requires 
that metadata be sent to the central server; 
- The central server is responsible for registering users 
and for sending push notifications. 
The network communication process in TIMS is shown in 
Fig. 1. The central server is storing user credentials required for 
authentication (FCM/APN push tokens) and is responsible for 
delivering messages between users. VoIP calls may be 
established in two modes – peer-to-peer or via a proxy (central 
server). Regardless of which type of communication is chosen, 
the server has to send, to the users, push notifications with the 
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call’s metadata – such as caller ID, IP address and 
communication port. If communications are based on the proxy 
mode, then all encrypted voice packets exchanged between 
users are sent through the proxy server.  
The TIMS server collects access logs and other metadata, 
containing information about the following: 
- Sending message from user A to user B; 
- Making a voice call between user A and B and 
distinguishing between the caller and the recipient; 
- Getting message from the server; 
- Registration events; 
- User IP address; 
- Users’ phone numbers; 
- Date and time of activity; 
- User’s time zone. 
 
Fig. 1. TIMS network communication diagram 
 
TIMS relies on a mobile app for smartphones – in our case 
for Android and iOS devices - and on a server application for 
controlling the registration process, delivering push 
notifications, exchanging messages and proxying or informing 
the recipient about an incoming voice call. The server 
application has no access to the content of messages and to voice 
packets – these are encrypted at smartphone level with keys that 
are not known to the server. The server application creates logs 
with every activity performed. The TIMS server has no access 
to those logs created at mobile endpoints. 
 
III. DATA ANALYSIS METHODS  
TIMS uses a nginx proxy server to distribute user requests 
between different services (e.g. messaging service or phone 
service). Nginx is also responsible for managing TLS sessions. 
All logs analyzed are standard access logs created by the nginx 
server. Access logs were turned on in the nginx.conf file, by the 
following line of code: 
access_log /var/log/nginx-access.log 
Logs were created in the nginx-access.log file. An 
application written in Java and a PostgreSQL database have 
been relied upon to analyze those logs and to perform research-
related activities.  
 
The main purposes of the Java application were as follows: 
-  Parsing nginx access logs files. 
- Adding processed data to the PostgreSQL database. 
- Retrieving location information based on IP addresses.  
- Updating location data in the PostgreSQL database. 
The main purposes of the PostgreSQL database were as 
follows: 
- Storing the processed access log data. 
- Performing analysis queries to process access log data. 
The data analysis process consisted of the following steps: 
1. Collecting access logs (nginx server). 
2. Parsing access logs and adding them, as records, to the 
database (Java application). 
3. Processing access log data using SQL queries 
(PostgreSQL database). 
4. Updating location information with access log 
processing results (Java application). 
A. Nginx access logs 
In order to show how sensitive information may be 
reconstructed from plain access logs, we have used the standard 
nginx access log format, without any extraordinary tweaks 
introduced for our research purposes. The default access log 
format used by nginx consists of the following:  
$remote_addr - $remote_user [$time_local] "$request" $status 
$body_bytes_sent "$http_referer" "$http_user_agent" 
where: 
- $remote_addr  is the IP address of a TIMS user, 
- $remote_user is a user identification number (e.g. user 
login in systems that rely on logins and passwords for 
authentication purposes), 
- $time_local is information about the time and date at 
which the request was performed, 
- $request is combined information about the request 
protocol, request method and requested URI, 
- $status is a status of the response to the user’s request, 
- $body_bytes_sent is a number of bytes sent to the user 
in response to the processed request, 
- $http_referer is information about the request referrer, 
- $http_user_agent is information about the user agent 
that made the request (about the operating system, 
Internet browser, etc.) 
 
The sample access log records that have been analyzed 
analysis had the following form: 
- Record 1: 31.179.57.255 – USER_A 
[10/Feb/2019:17:56:12 +0100] "PUT 
/tims/tokens/tokens HTTP/1.1" 200 894 "-" "TIMS/1.15 
(iPhone; iOS 12.1.2; Scale/3.00)"  
- Record 2: 37.47.24.167 – USER_B 
[23/Jun/2019:23:31:30 +0200] "GET 
/tims/accounts/info/ HTTP/1.1" 200 49 "-" 
"Dalvik/2.1.0 (Linux; U; Android 8.0.0; SM-A600FN 
Build/R16NW)"  
- Record 3: 89.66.210.147 – USER_C 
[20/Nov/2019:17:11:17 +0100] "DELETE 
/v1/messages/USER_C/1575216676287 HTTP/1.1" 
204 0 "-" "okhttp/3.6.0" 
 
Table I shows the results of parsing sample access log 
records in accordance with the default nginx access log format. 





B. Java application 
A Java application, known as AccessLogsAnalyzer, was 
written with Java 1.8 SDK. It uses three external dependencies: 
- com.google.code.gson:gson:2.8.5 – library for JSON 
serialization and deserialization to/from Java Objects, 
- io.ipgeolocation:ipgeolocation:1.0.11 – library with 
SDK for location service, 
- org.postgresql:postgresql:42.2.8 – JDBC driver for 
PostgreSQL. 
 






The pl.edu.wat.accesslogsanalyzer.bean.LogData class 
was a standard java bean class (POJO). It was responsible for 
parsing and storing the access log record data in object style. the 
main part of class code is presented below: 
public static String INSERT_SQL = 
        "INSERT INTO access_log(" + 
                "ip," + 
                 …… 
                "agent) " 
        + "VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)"; 
 
// create LogData object from line with one access log record 
public static LogData parseLine(String line) throws Exception 
{ 
    LogData logData = new LogData(); 
        …… 
    String datas[] = line.split("\""); 
        …… 
    logData.setIp(datas1[0]); 
            …… 
    logData.setAgent(datas[5]); 
        …… 




class offered the main entry point for a program running in the 
parsing mode. In this mode, the application read data from the 
access log file, line by line. For each line that was read, the 
application attempted to create a  
pl.edu.wat.accesslogsanalyzer.bean.LogData object. Then, this 
object was inserted into the PostgreSQL database. The main part 
of class code is presented below: 
pstmt = 
connection.prepareStatement(LogData.INSERT_SQL); 
    …… 
LogData logData = LogData.parseLine(line); 
    …… 
pstmt.setString(1, logData.getIp()); 
    …… 
pstmt.setString(15, logData.getAgent()); 
    …… 
pstmt.executeBatch(); 
 
The  pl.edu.wat.accesslogsanalyzer.AccessLogsAnalyzer 
AddLocalization code offered the main entry point for a 
program updating the location mode. In this mode, the 
application read data from the PostgreSQL database. For each 
database record that was read, the application attempted to 
retrieve location information based on the IP address. Then, the 
database record was updated and stored in the PostgreSQL 
database. The main part of class code is presented below: 
// update 
pstmt = connection.prepareStatement("update " + tableName 
+ " set localization = ? where id = ?"); 
    …… 
// select 
rs = st.executeQuery("select id, ip from " + tableName + " 
where localization is NULL"); 
while (rs.next()) 
{ 
        …… 
    String ip = rs.getString(2); 
    String localization = getLocalization(ip); 
 
    pstmt.setString(1, localization); 
        …… 
    pstmt.executeUpdate(); 
} 
C. PostgreSQL database 
For analysis purposes, the parsed access log data were 
stored in the access_log table of the PostgreSQL database. 
Definition of the access_log table is presented below: 
create table if not exists access_log 
( 
   id serial not null 
      constraint access_log_pk 
         primary key, 
   ip varchar(255), 
   unused1 varchar(255), 
   userid varchar(8192), 
   datestring varchar(1024), 
   date timestamp, 
   requestdatastring varchar(8192), 
   requestdatamethod varchar(1024), 
   requestdatauri varchar(8192), 
   requestdataprotocol varchar(1024), 
   responsecodestring varchar(255), 
TABLE I 
PARSED LOG RECORDS 
Data Record 1 Record 2 
$remote_addr  31.179.57.255 37.47.24.167 
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   responsecode integer, 
   resposebytesstring varchar(255), 
   resposebytes integer, 
   unused2 varchar(255), 
   agent varchar(8192) 
); 
D. SQL queries 
The access log analysis was carried out with SQL queries 
executed by the PostgreSQL database engine. Three SQL 





The ip_mettings query was used to identify all users with 
the same IP addresses (three first IP v4 sub-groups) reported 
within this same period of time (limited to 30 minutes). The 
SQL query is presented below: 
-- query ip_mettings 
select distinct sub.a1_user, sub.a2_user, sub.ip, sub.date 
from 
( 
select a1.userid as "a1_user", 
       a2.userid as "a2_user", 
       regexp_replace(a1.ip, '\.\d+$', '.0') as "ip", 
       a1.date as "a1_date", 
       a2.date as "a2_date", 
       DATE(a1.date) as date 
from access_log a1 inner join access_log a2 on 
regexp_replace(a1.ip, '\.\d+$', '.0') = regexp_replace(a2.ip, 
'\.\d+$', '.0') 
where a1.userid in 
      ( 
        'USER_A’, 
        …… 
        'USER_G’  
      ) 
and a2.userid in 
      ( 
        'USER_A’, 
        …… 
        'USER_G’  
      ) 
and a1.ip != TIMS_SERVER_IP and a1.userid != a2.userid 
and a1.date >= a2.date and a1.date - a2.date < '30 minutes' 
    ) as sub 
order by sub.date asc; 
 
Results of the ip_mettings query were stored in the 
ip_mettings database table. The definition of the ip_mettings 
table is presented below: 
create table if not exists ip_mettings 
( 
   id serial not null 
      constraint ip_mettings_pk 
         primary key, 
   user1 varchar(255), 
   user2 varchar(255), 
   ip varchar(255), 
   date date, 
   localization varchar(8192) 
); 
 
The ip_network_count query was used to find locations that 
were most frequently visited by a given user. The SQL query is 
presented below: 
-- query ip_network_count  
select count(sub.ip), sub.ip 
from 
( 
select regexp_replace(a1.ip, '\.\d+$', '.0') as ip, 
       DATE(a1.date) as date 
from access_log a1 
where a1.userid = 'USER A' 
and a1.ip != TIMS_SERVER_IP 
order by a1.date asc 
    ) as sub 
group by sub.ip 
order by count(sub.ip) desc; 
 
Results of the ip_network_count query were stored in the 
ip_network_count database table. Definition of the 
ip_network_count table is presented below: 
create table if not exists ip_network_count 
( 
   id serial not null 
      constraint ip_network_count_pk 
         primary key, 
   ip varchar(255), 
   count integer, 
   localization varchar(8192) 
); 
 
The ip_network_list query was used to find locations that 
were most frequently visited by a given user. The SQL query is 
presented below: 
-- query ip_network_list  
select distinct sub.ip, sub.date 
from 
( 
select regexp_replace(a1.ip, '\.\d+$', '.0') as ip, 
       DATE(a1.date) as date 
from access_log a1 
where a1.userid = 'USER A' 
and a1.ip != TIMS_SERVER_IP 
    ) as sub 
order by sub.date asc; 
 
Results of the ip_network_list query were stored in the 
ip_network_list database table. Definition of the 
ip_network_list table is presented below: 
create table if not exists ip_network_list 
( 
   id serial not null 
      constraint ip_network_list_pk 
         primary key, 
   ip varchar(255), 
   date date, 
   localization varchar(8192) 
); 
ACCESS LOGS – UNDERESTIMATED PRIVACY RISKS 409 
 
 
E. Execution environment 
All analyses were carried out on a MacBook Pro (2017 
model with an Intel Core i5 3.1GHz processor and 8GB RAM) 
running macOS Mojave 10.14.6. IntelliJ IDEA CE 2019.3, 
DataGrip 2019.2.6, JDK 1.8.0_161 and PostgreSQL 10.2 were 
used. The AccessLogsAnalyzer application was lunched directly 
from IntelliJ IDEA CE. Database tables and SQL queries were 
written and executed in DataGrip. ip_mettings was the longest 
running query, taking over 1 hour and 12 minutes to complete. 
The remaining queries took no longer than 2 minutes to 
complete. 
IV. RESULTS 
A. Data collected 
The TIMS service was deployed and used by a limited 
number of users – the authors of the paper and their family 
members. All data was collected between 12 February 2019 and 
20 November 2019. For the purpose of this paper, the real phone 
numbers of the users will not be revealed – we will use such 
terms as User A (or USER_A), User B (or USER_B), etc.  
During the period of time referred to above, we managed to 
collect 372,340 access log records. According to Table II, there 
were 209,498 access logs for USER_A, 60,850 access logs for 
USER_B, 56,716 access logs for USER_C, 25,904 access logs 
for USER_D, 8,079 access logs for USER_E, 6,267 access logs 
for USER_F, and 5,026 access logs for USER_G. Each log was 
related to a voice call made/received or a text message 
sent/received. From each log, we were able to get the following: 
- Date and time of event; 
- Identifiers of the communicating users; 
- Type of event (sending/receiving text message, 
making/receiving voice call); 
- User IP address; 




The data were originally stored in nginx access log files. 
Therefore, for further analysis, it was necessary to parse the data 
into the database. Parsing and analysis processes were 
performed with the use of tools and procedures described in 
section III. All steps of the analysis process were performed 
with the use of data from the database created. 
The collected IP addresses were geolocated using the 
ipgeolocation.io [7] API service. With that service, we were 
able to get location information about each IP address, 
including, inter alia, the following: 




- Postal code; 
- Latitude and longitude; 
Geolocation data were added to the database, for further 
analysis of user habits. The geolocation data were stored in the 
JSON format. The location data obtained from API were 
analyzed to identify user habits and their location over time. 
 
B. Geolocation analysis 
The geolocation data acquired from API enabled us to come 
up with several statistics regarding TIMS users. These included, 
inter alia, the following: 
- Determine the most frequent location of a user over a 
specific period of time– data acquired by the 
ip_network_count query; 
- Determine all IP addresses and locations of the users – 
data acquired by the ip_network_list query; 
- Predict a probable physical meeting place and time for 
two or more users – data acquired by the ip_mettings 
query. 
 
Fig. 2. Top places visited by User A 
 
All locations were predicted based on IP data. The  
accuracy of that data allows us to visualize the location with a 
specific city district. 128 most frequently visited locations were 
chosen for User A. The Locations were visualized using Google 
Maps and they may be seen in Fig. 2. Each pin depicts one place 
that was visited. The map does not show the frequency of visits, 
but it is possible to derive that information from the database 
and to generate an appropriate report. No summary of all user 
locations has been presented in a graphic form, as it is similar to 
the map presenting the most frequently visited locations. It 
consists of much larger data set, e.g. for User A it has 1,011 
entries identified during the period of the experiment. 
We have also drawn up a report predicting the probable 
physical meeting places and times for two or more users. While 
creating that report, we assumed that two users were able to 
meet if the first 24 bits of their IP (version 4) addresses were 
equal and if their log times were the same (with the accuracy of 
30 minutes). We identified 1,011 potential meeting locations 
over the entire duration of the experiment. Figure 3 presents the 
user meeting locations, globally. Each pin informs us about the 
users being present at a specific location, e.g. A B means a 
meeting of User A with User B. 
TABLE II 
NUMBER OF LOG ENTRIES COLLECTED 













Fig. 3. Physical meetings of the TIMS users 
 
Figure 4 presents the users’ meeting locations in Warsaw. 
The accuracy of the API geolocation service enables us to 
identify user meeting locations in several city districts. More 
accurate data can be collected from telecom operators. 
Therefore, the level of accuracy may be easily increased to 
specific street names. 
 
Fig. 4. Physical meetings of TIMS users in Warsaw, Poland 
 
C. Result improvements and future work 
The maps presented in Fig. 2, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 were created 
using geolocation data acquired from ipgeolocation.io. No 
information about accuracy of the service is available, but our 
experimental data confirms that the users were physically 
present at individual locations at the time in question. Some 
interesting results of research focusing on improving the 
accuracy of geolocation data are presented in [8]. Good results 
may also be achieved by testing other API geolocation services, 
especially those dedicated to the specific region of interest. 
Geolocation data may be also more accurate if TIMS collects 
some more metadata, e.g. latency of communication. 
Other analyses may take into account logs generated by 
dedicated TIMS services, such as telephone or messaging 
services. This will provide additional information about user 
calls and messaging and will enable to identify, for instance, 
when and for how long selected users where talking on the 
phone.  
A sample analysis, focusing on the users’ location only, has 
been presented in this paper. In future work, we plan to build the 
users’ contact network, analyze relations between users and 
define the shortest path between them. That type of analysis 
requires larger amounts of data and a larger set of users. We 
estimate, according to [9], that at least 10,000 users will be 
required. In order to collect a sufficient amount of data, the  
service will have to be operated for at least 6 months. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Access logs are capable of revealing a lot of information 
about instant messenger users. Even small amounts of data – 
date, time, IP address, phone number and communication 
method - allowed us to identify the users’ location, habits and 
contacts. The set of data collected by TIMS is the minimum 
logging level for that type of service, so one can assume that 
commercial services collect more data and are capable of 
obtaining even more accurate results in profiling their users. 
This seems to be a serious issue affecting the privacy of instant 
messenger service users. Whenever possible, they should be 
using applications from privacy-friendly developers who 
guarantee that no access logs are collected and analyzed. 
However, it is extremely difficult to determine what is being 
collected on the server side in a production environment, 
because the users are not able to access any production reports. 
They should rely on information published by privacy-focused 
foundations and independent journalists.  
There are also other ways of ensuring privacy for instant 
messenger users. If they have to provide their phone number in 
order to register, they may provide a phone number that is 
different than the one they are using on a daily basis. This 
information is only used for the purpose of initial registration – 
afterwards, communications is established fully independently 
of that number. The privacy of location may be protected by 
using VPN services – especially those of the self-hosted variety. 
This ensures that the service provider does not know the current 
IP address of the user, rendering IP-based tracking impossible. 
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